The ability to interpret the mental state of another agent based on its behavior, also called Theory of Mind (ToM), is crucial for humans in any kind of social interaction. Artificial systems, such as intelligent assistants, would also greatly benefit from such mentalizing capabilities. However, humans and systems alike are bound by limitations in their available computational resources. This raises the need for satisficing mentalizing, reconciling accuracy and efficiency in mental state inference that is good enough for a given situation. In this paper, we present different Bayesian models of ToM reasoning and evaluate them based on actual human behavior data that were generated under different kinds of uncertainties. We propose a Switching approach that combines specialized models, embodying simplifying presumptions, in order to achieve a more statisficing mentalizing compared to a Full Bayesian ToM model.

In many domains, humans appear to combine perceptual cues in a near-optimal, probabilistic fashion: two noisy pieces of information tend to be combined linearly with weights proportional to the precision of each cue. Here we present a case where structural information plays an important role. The presence of a background cue gives rise to the possibility of occlusion, and places a soft constraint on the location of a target – in effect propelling it forward. We present an ideal observer model of depth estimation for this situation where structural or ordinal information is important and then fit the model to human data from a stereo-matching task. To test whether subjects are truly using ordinal cues in a probabilistic manner we then vary the uncertainty of the task. We find that the model accurately predicts shifts in subject’s behavior. Our results indicate that the nervous system estimates depth ordering in a probabilistic fashion and estimates the structure of the visual scene during depth perception.